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This is a polemical response to Howard Wiseman’s recent paper, “The two Bell’s theorems of John
Bell”. Wiseman argues that, in 1964, Bell established a conflict between the quantum mechanical
predictions and the joint assumptions of determinism and (what is now usually known as) “param-
eter independence”. Only later, in 1976, did Bell, according to Wiseman, first establish a conflict
between the quantum mechanical predictions and locality alone (in the specific form that Bell would
sometimes call “local causality”). Thus, according to Wiseman, the long-standing disagreements
about what, exactly, Bell’s theorem does and does not prove can be understood largely as miscom-
munications resulting from the fact that there are really two quite distinct “Bell’s theorems”. My
goal here is to lay out what Wiseman briefly describes as an “alternate reading” of Bell’s 1964 pa-
per, according to which (quoting Wiseman here) “the first paragraph of Bell’s ‘Formulation’ section
[should be seen] as an essential part of his 1964 theorem, the first part of a two-part argument.” I
will argue in particular that this “alternate reading” is the correct way to understand Bell’s 1964
paper and that Wiseman’s reading is strongly inconsistent with the available evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
My goal here will be to summarize and record my side
of a debate that has erupted in response to Howard Wise-
man’s recent paper on “The two Bell’s theorems of John
Bell.” [1] The debate concerns the question (much in the
air as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of Bell’s 1964 the-
orem) of what, exactly, Bell did and didn’t prove in 1964.
[2] My view, which seems to match that of Bell himself
as well as several other contributors to this forum (in-
cluding for example Tim Maudlin and Jean Bricmont),
is that already in 1964 Bell demonstrated the need for
non-locality in any theory able to reproduce the stan-
dard quantum predictions. (“Non-locality” here means a
violation of a generalized prohibition on faster-than-light
causal influences.) Whereas the opposing view (which is
probably a majority view among normal physicists who
have not studied Bell’s work carefully, and is especially
prominent among those physicists Wiseman describes as
“operationalists”) is that Bell only established a conflict
between the empirical predictions of quantum theory and
the joint assumptions of locality and determinism.
Those adopting the opposing view tend to retain al-
legiance to locality (which, they suggest, is after all
a requirement of relativity) and insist that the up-
shot of Bell’s work is that determinism must be aban-
doned. That is, they regard Bell’s theorem as fundamen-
tally a no-hidden-variables proof and hence a vindication
of some standard (orthodox/Copenhagen/operationalist)
interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is in con-
trast to Bell’s own view, according to which the conflict
with experiment cannot be blamed on determinism or
any other departure from orthodoxy, but instead estab-
lishes that, however strongly motivated it might be by
relativity theory, locality is false.
Wiseman’s view, expressed in his recent paper, is nei-
ther of the above. Instead, his view is that both sides are
right – because they are talking about different things.
In particular, according to Wiseman, the theorem in
Bell’s 1964 paper shows exactly what the operationalists
claim: reproducing the quantum mechanical predictions
requires abandoning either locality or deterministic hid-
den variables. Whereas, again according to Wiseman,
Bell would later (in 1976) prove a second theorem estab-
lishing a conflict between the quantum mechanical pre-
dictions and a unitary notion of “local causality” that
captures the prohibition on faster-than-light causal in-
fluences for general (stochastic, i.e., not necessarily de-
terministic) theories. So (according to Wiseman) Bell,
Maudlin, Bricmont, myself, and others are correct to say
that “Bell’s theorem proves non-locality” – if by “non-
locality” we mean a failure of Bell’s “local causality”
condition – while simultaneously those taking the op-
posing view are right to say that “Bell’s theorem proves
only that deterministic hidden-variable theories have to
be non-local.” We’re both right; we just mean different
things by “Bell’s theorem”. It was simple miscommuni-
cation all along.
But I simply don’t think that’s right. The truth, I
think, is that the people taking the opposing view have
simply missed, or misunderstood, the role of the EPR
argument in Bell’s 1964 paper.1 And Wiseman, in con-
structing an interpretation of that paper according to
which the opposing view is correct (even if only in re-
gard to that paper) essentially just repeats this common
misunderstanding.
There is a lot going on in Wiseman’s paper and hence
a lot that a full analysis of it would need to go into. Pro-
viding such an analysis is not my goal here. Instead I will
focus exclusively on the question of what, exactly, Bell
wrote and meant and did in his 1964 paper. It will turn
out that much of what is under dispute here hinges on
1 Or they have refused, on some kind of anti-realist philosophical
grounds, to even entertain as meaningful the issues that Einstein
et al. – and Bell – raised.
2exactly what Bell meant by the word “locality” and, in
particular, on whether his several comments about “lo-
cality” should be understood as attempts to provide a
generalized definition of this term (Wiseman’s view), or
instead (my view) merely as descriptions of a narrower
implication of locality in the context of the particular
type of theory that Bell took to have been previously
shown, by Einstein et al., to be required by a more gen-
eralized notion of locality. Fittingly, the dispute also in-
volves a disagreement about how to understand Bell’s
intentions with regard to his repeated citation of a cer-
tain passage from Einstein’s “Autobiographical Notes”.
[3]
In the following section I review Wiseman’s reading
of the 1964 paper and then present, in the subsequent
section, an overview of my own reading. A final section
then elaborates on the several problems I see in Wise-
man’s interpretation and summarizes the issues as I see
them. There is a lot of quoting from Bell, Wiseman, and
Einstein. So to make reading this essay as easy as pos-
sible I have color-coded the quotations from these three
sources: Bell (1964) in blue, Wiseman (2014) in red, and
Einstein (1949) in green. Quotations from other sources
are cited in the usual way.
II. WISEMAN’S READING OF BELL’S 1964
PAPER
Wiseman describes Bell’s 1964 theorem as showing
“that there are quantum predictions incompatible with
any theory satisfying locality and determinism” and em-
phasizes that “Bell’s 1964 theorem suggests that Bell ex-
periments leave us with a choice: accept that physical
phenomena violate determinism, or accept that they vi-
olate locality.” As Wiseman acknowledges, this reading
puts him in the “almost universal” category of misun-
derstanding that Bell himself would later call attention
to:
“My own first paper on this subject ...
starts with a summary of the EPR argu-
ment from locality to deterministic hidden
variables. But the commentators have almost
universally reported that it begins with deter-
ministic hidden variables.” [4]
Nevertheless, Wiseman insists that his reading of the
1964 paper (contrary to Bell’s own later description of
what he had done there) is correct. How does he justify
this reading?
Wiseman begins by quoting Bell’s several statements
involving “locality” in the 1964 paper. The first relevant
passage occurs in “1 Introduction” (which Wiseman and
I agree is really more like an abstract):
“The paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen was advanced as an argument that
quantum mechanics could not be a complete
theory but should be supplemented by addi-
tional variables. These additional variables
were to restore to the theory causality and
locality[∗]. In this note that idea will be for-
mulated mathematically and shown to be in-
compatible with the statistical predictions of
quantum mechanics. It is the requirement of
locality, or more precisely that the result of
a measurement on one system be unaffected
by operations on a distant system with which
it has interacted in the past, that creates the
essential difficulty.”
Bell’s footnote references the following excerpt from Ein-
stein’s “Autobiographical Notes” in the 1949 Schilpp vol-
ume: “But on one supposition we should, in my opinion,
absolutely hold fast: the real factual situation of the sys-
tem S2 is independent of what is done with the system
S1, which is spatially separated from the former.”
Wiseman proceeds to assume “that the ‘real factual
situation’ of a system is what is probed by measuring it”
and notes that “the notions of being ‘independent of what
is done with’ or ‘unaffected by operations on’ a system
clearly refer to the action of an agent (say Alice) on her
system, and mean that Alice’s action has no statistical ef-
fect.” It is not completely clear what, exactly, Wiseman
takes the relationship to be, between Bell’s own words
here and the words he quotes from Einstein. (This will
be discussed extensively later.) But Wiseman does seem
to allow his interpretation of Einstein’s words to influence
his interpretation of Bell’s words, and he does acknowl-
edge that “Bell’s definition of locality follows from the
supposition of Einstein’s which [Bell] quotes.” In any
case, all of this leads Wiseman to formalize Bell’s defini-
tion of locality as:
Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|b, c, λ) (1)
which is the same condition that is usually referred to as
“parameter independence” (PI) in the more recent Bell
literature.2
2 The “θ” subscripts in the formula refer to the particular can-
didate theory assigning the probabilities in question. Note also
that the formula remains somewhat vague until one specifies ex-
actly what each symbol – and in particular the notoriously con-
troversial λ – is meant to capture. Wiseman is not explicit about
this, but seems to follow Bell in understanding the λ (together
with c) as denoting a complete specification of the physical state
of the particle pair at some appropriate time prior to any mea-
surement. But this is also slightly puzzling since Wiseman also
seems to think that “[f]or the operationalist, locality [i.e., PI] is a
natural assumption...” In my opinion, any genuine “operational-
ist” would simply balk at a notion of locality that required (to use
Bell’s later characterization) comparing probabilities conditioned
on “a full specification of local beables in a [certain] space-time
region”. [5] Thus I think to some extent Wiseman conflates PI
with a (distinct, and genuinely operationally meaningful) “no
signaling” condition. (See Ref. [6] for some further relevant dis-
cussion.) And I think this conflation is based to some extent on
3Wiseman also quotes Bell’s summary statement, from
the Conclusion of his 1964 paper:
“In a theory in which parameters are added to
quantum mechanics to determine the results
of individual measurements, without chang-
ing the statistical predictions, there must be
a mechanism whereby the setting of one mea-
suring device can influence the reading of an-
other instrument, however remote.”
Wiseman italicizes the phrase “the setting of one mea-
suring device can influence the reading of another instru-
ment, however remote” and explains that he regards this
as constituting a formulation of “(the negation of) local-
ity”. Wiseman writes:
“As the above quote shows, Bell definitely
means locality specifically as the absence of
any influence of the setting a on the remote
measurement device. This confirms my above
reading of his definition of locality in [equa-
tion (1) above]. In fact, this reading is con-
firmed in two more places in the paper.”
The two other places cited by Wiseman include the first
paragraph of Bell’s “2 Formulation” where Bell writes:
“Now we make the hypothesis[∗], and it seems
one at least worth considering, that if the
two measurements are made at places remote
from one another the orientation of one mag-
net does not influence the result obtained
with the other.”
(Note that Bell again here cites the same passage from
Einstein’s “Autobiographical Notes” that was quoted
earlier.) The other passage that Wiseman regards as
confirming his interpretation of what Bell means by “lo-
cality” comes later in Bell’s section 2:
“The vital assumption[∗] is that the result B
for particle 2 does not depend on the setting
a of the magnet for particle 1, nor A on b.”
(Note that Bell here cites Einstein for a third time.)
Having thus laid out his evidence for interpreting Bell
as having meant, by “locality” in 1964, our Equation (1)
above, Wiseman turns his attention to Bell’s recapitula-
tion, in “2 Formulation”, of the EPR argument. Wise-
man quotes Bell’s one-sentence summary of the argument
“Since we can predict in advance the result
of measuring any chosen component of ~σ2 by
forgetting the θ subscripts in Equation (1), i.e., thinking that the
probabilities this formula relates can be understood as empirical
frequencies. (Notice for example Wiseman’s use of the phrase
“statistical effect”.) But, having noted it here, I will ignore this
side issue in the remainder of this paper.
previously measuring the same component of
~σ1, it follows that the result of any such mea-
surement must actually be predetermined.”
and then remarks:
“Here Bell has made a mistake. His con-
clusion (predetermined results) does not fol-
low from his premises (predictability, and
[PI]). This is simple to see from the follow-
ing counter-example. Orthodox quantum me-
chanics (OQM) is a theory in which the set-
ting a of one device does not statistically in-
fluence the result B obtained with the other:
Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|b, c, λ)
Here, if c were to correspond to preparation
of a mixed quantum state ρc, the variable λ
would allow for a pure-state decomposition;
in purely operational QM, only c would ap-
pear. But in OQM it is of course not true
that the results of spin measurements are pre-
determined for a singlet state as Bell is con-
sidering.”
Wiseman is here pointing out that OQM (which respects
PI and is hence “local” in the sense Wiseman attributes
here to Bell) predicts the usual kind of perfect correla-
tions in the EPR setup, but fails to attribute outcome-
determining local hidden-variables to the individual par-
ticles in the EPR pair. Wiseman, that is, regards or-
thodox quantum mechanics as a counter-example to the
EPR argument – or, at least, the recapitulation of it that
Wiseman interprets Bell as giving here.
And that is basically that. Wiseman closes by assert-
ing (presumably on the grounds that he considers the
argument as presented invalid) that “Bell’s EPR para-
graph forms no part of his 1964 theorem” and remarking
as follows on his accusation that Bell made a mistake in
thinking that the EPR argument (“from locality to de-
terministic hidden variables”) was valid:
“I would classify Bell’s mistake in this para-
graph as a peccadillo, having no impact on
the main result in his paper. It would have
been an easy mistake for Bell to have made,
if he had the idea that EPR had already
proven determinism from some sort of local-
ity assumption, and did not think hard about
whether it was the same as the locality as-
sumption he was about to use in his own
theorem. Indeed the paper could be made
completely sound by replacing ‘it follows’ in
the above (‘Since we can predict...’) quote
by ‘the obvious explanation is’, or ‘EPR’s
premises imply’. Although Bell believed that
he was reproducing EPR’s argument, EPR’s
premises (which are never stated by Bell) are
not equivalent to locality (as defined here by
4Bell), and they do justify the conclusion of
pre-determined outcomes...”
(For a proof that EPR’s premises, including a notion of
locality distinct from the one Wiseman attributes here to
Bell, we are sent to an Appendix in Wiseman’s paper.)
III. MY OWN READING
Let me here give an overview of my own reading of
Bell’s 1964 paper, and then come back (in the next sec-
tion) to explain exactly what I find implausible about
Wiseman’s interpretation.
I would begin with something Wiseman seems to
barely notice: the title of Bell’s paper. This, I think, al-
ready makes it quite obvious that Bell intends his novel
result to be understood as being built “On the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen paradox”. That is, I think, Bell takes
himself (quite correctly) to be adding a crucial second
step to what had been previously established by Einstein
et al. This foundational role of the EPR argument in
Bell’s work is made quite clear in the first section, “1
Introduction”, which I quote here in full:
“The paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen was advanced as an argument that
quantum mechanics could not be a complete
theory but should be supplemented by addi-
tional variables. These additional variables
were to restore to the theory causality and
locality[∗]. In this note that idea will be for-
mulated mathematically and shown to be in-
compatible with the statistical predictions of
quantum mechanics. It is the requirement of
locality, or more precisely that the result of
a measurement on one system be unaffected
by operations on a distant system with which
it has interacted in the past, that creates the
essential difficulty. There have been attempts
to show that even without such a separabil-
ity or locality requirement no ‘hidden vari-
able’ interpretation of quantum mechanics is
possible. These attempts have been exam-
ined elsewhere and found wanting. Moreover,
a hidden variable interpretation of elemen-
tary quantum theory has been explicitly con-
structed. That particular interpretation has
indeed a grossly non-local structure. This is
characteristic, according to the result to be
proved here, of any such theory which repro-
duces exactly the quantum mechanical pre-
dictions.”
The second part of the paragraph here tells us some-
thing about Bell’s motivation for undertaking the re-
ported work (namely, he wanted to see if any determinis-
tic completion of quantum theory would have to have the
“grossly non-local structure” displayed by the de Broglie
- Bohm pilot-wave theory).
But let us focus here on the first part, which (like Wise-
man) I read as essentially an abstract of the paper. It
begins by noting that, according to the earlier EPR ar-
gument, a hidden-variable type theory could “restore to
the theory [i.e., quantum mechanics] causality and local-
ity”. This clearly implies that, according to Bell, Einstein
et al. had previously established that ordinary quantum
mechanics violates both “causality and locality”. The vi-
olation of causality (which, like Wiseman, I understand
here to simply mean “determinism”) is uncontroversial
and unremarkable. But it is important to appreciate
that already here Bell is claiming (and/or endorsing Ein-
stein’s previous claim) that ordinary quantum mechanics
violates “locality”. This is certainly consistent with what
we know of Einstein’s criticisms of quantum mechanics
(to be elaborated further in the following section). In
particular, it is consistent with the passage from Ein-
stein that Bell specifically chose to cite here (and then
two subsequent times) as, evidently, capturing his (Bell’s)
own understanding of this concept:
“But on one supposition we should, in my
opinion, absolutely hold fast: the real factual
situation of the system S2 is independent of
what is done with the system S1 which is spa-
tially separated from the former.”
In my opinion, what Bell means by “locality” has thus
already been made rather clear: he means some sense
of “locality” that (i) is reasonably well-captured by the
Einstein passage from “Autobiographical Notes”, (ii) had
been involved in the EPR argument, and (iii) is violated
by ordinary quantum mechanics. (Parameter Indepen-
dence, of course, satisfies none of these three criteria.)
But what about the immediately-following sentences
of Bell’s “1 Introduction”? Here Bell writes: “In this
note that idea will be formulated mathematically and
shown to be incompatible with the statistical predictions
of quantum mechanics. It is the requirement of locality,
or more precisely that the result of a measurement on one
system be unaffected by operations on a distant system
with which it has interacted in the past, that creates the
essential difficulty.” First off, what is “that idea” which
will be formualted mathematically? I read Bell here as
referring, with “that idea”, back to the conjunction of
“causality and locality” – i.e., the two features that were
to be restored by the introduction of additional variables.
This is, after all, precisely what he does later formulate
mathematically in the first equation appearing in his pa-
per. According to this equation, which I reproduce here,
the outcomes are mathematically determined by locally-
accessible variables:
A(a, λ) = ±1, B(b, λ) = ±1. (2)
I thus interpret the statement about locality from the
abstract (namely, “the result of a measurement on one
system [should] be unaffected by operations on a distant
system with which it has interacted in the past”) not as
an attempt to give a general formulation or definition of
5locality (he has already done this by quoting Einstein!),
but instead as a description of the specific implication of
locality (to deterministic hidden variable theories) that
he will use later in the body of his paper. This seems
perfectly natural since the statement appears in (what
amounts to) an abstract of the paper, i.e., in a summary
of the novel result the paper will announce. Note in par-
ticular that the statement in question comes just after the
future-tensed statement about what “will be formulated
mathematically”. Whereas the first two sentences of the
abstract refer to the earlier work of EPR – and Einstein’s
earlier formulation of locality – in the past tense.
It is also natural to interpret, in this same way, Bell’s
statement from later in the paper, just after he writes
what I have transcribed in equation (2) above:
“The vital assumption is that the result B for
particle 2 does not depend on the setting a,
of the magnet for particle 1, nor A on b.”
Here, that is, he is not telling us what “locality” (in the
most general sense) means, but instead calling our at-
tention to a particular feature of the deterministic model
he’s just written down: namely, it is a local deterministic
hidden-variable theory. And similarly for his summariz-
ing sentence in “6 Conclusion”:
“In a theory in which parameters are added to
quantum mechanics to determine the results
of individual measurements, without chang-
ing the statistical predictions, there must be
a mechanism whereby the setting of one mea-
suring device can influence the reading of an-
other instrument, however remote.”
Note in particular that the violation of locality (namely,
the existence of “a mechanism whereby the setting of one
measuring device can influence the reading of another in-
strument, however remote”) is described here as applying
specifically to deterministic hidden variable theories (i.e.,
theories “in which parameters are added to quantum me-
chanics to determine the results of individual measure-
ments”.)
These three statements – that Wiseman interprets as
attempts to define “locality” – thus instead seem to me
to be clearly only attempts to describe the specific im-
plication of locality that Bell uses in the context of the
deterministic hidden-variable type theory that, he argues
(citing EPR), is required to restore locality to QM.
Thus, I think the overall structure of Bell’s paper is
as follows: first he cites EPR as having previously estab-
lished that locality (in Einstein’s sense) requires positing
deterministic hidden variables (in order to explain the
predicted perfect correlations); then, in the main body
of the paper, he lays out his new proof that this kind of
local deterministic theory runs afoul of the quantum pre-
dictions when more general correlations are considered.
It is crucial here that Bell takes EPR to have previously
established the need for deterministic hidden variables in
order to restore locality. Bell is effectively (and, in ret-
rospect, somewhat naively and unfortunately) taking for
granted that his readers understand that this has already
been established, and is thus (quite reasonably) focusing
his expositional attention on the novel result that he has
established, building on the foundation laid by EPR. If
we drop this overall context (i.e., ignore the foundational
role of EPR and assume that Bell is starting from scratch)
we are likely to misinterpret much of what he says, about
“locality” in particular.
There is, however, one statement about “locality” in
Bell’s paper which is, from my point of view, somewhat
problematic. This occurs in the first pargraph of “2 For-
mulation” where Bell is recapitulating the EPR argument
(that he would later characterize as an argument “from
locality to deterministic hidden variables”):
“With the example advocated by Bohm and
Aharanov, the EPR argument is the follow-
ing. Consider a pair of spin one-half particles
formed somehow in the singlet spin state and
moving freely in opposite directions. Mea-
surements can be made, say by Stern-Gerlach
magnets, on selected components of the spins
σ1 and σ2. If measurement of the compo-
nent σ1 ·a, where a is some unit vector, yields
the value +1 then, according to quantum me-
chanics, measurement of σ2 · a must yield the
value −1 and vice versa. Now we make the
hypothesis[∗], and it seems one at least worth
considering, that if the two measurements are
made at places remote from one another the
orientation of one magnet does not influence
the result obtained with the other. Since we
can predict in advance the result of measuring
any chosen component of σ2, by previously
measuring the same component of σ1, it fol-
lows that the result of any such measurement
must actually be predetermined.”
This is the only point in the paper where Bell is ac-
tually attempting to recapitulate the logic of the EPR
argument and hence explain exactly why and how pre-
determination really “follows” from locality and perfect
correlations. So it is here that we would most want and
expect to see an explicit general formulation of locality
(rather than just some statement about one of locality’s
implications in the specific context of deterministic the-
ories). And, unfortunately, Bell disappoints us. Other
than citing Einstein, what he says here about locality
(“if the two measurements are made at places remote
from one another the orientation of one magnet does not
influence the result obtained with the other”) certainly
falls short of a general formulation (along the lines that
he would later give, in 1976 and 1990). It should be clear,
for example, from the involvement of “magnets” that he
is only here talking about some kind of implication of
locality in the specific EPR-Bohm setup (with spin 1/2
particles whose spins are measured using Stern-Gerlach
6magnets).
But even leaving that disappointing specificity aside,
what Bell says here seems problematic in another way
as well: what does it mean to say that some distant in-
tervention “does not influence the result obtained” by a
nearby measurement? As the following five decades of
Bell literature eloquently illustrate, it is notoriously dif-
ficult and controversial to precisely capture the idea of
causal influence in the context of general (not necessarily
deterministic) theories.3 So it is simply not clear how to
translate Bell’s words here (about locality) into a sharp
mathematical statement in terms of which the EPR ar-
gument might be rigorously rehearsed.
So, and especially taking into account the five decades
of controversy that have followed, it must be admitted
that Bell’s recapitulation of the EPR argument in this
paragraph leaves something to be desired. And given the
increasing attention that Bell gave to this very point in
his subsequent writings (for example, by later providing
more fully general mathematical formulations of the idea
of “locality” and by stressing more explicitly the precise
arguments by which ordinary QM can be seen to violate
locality and by which deterministic hidden variables can
be seen to be genuinely required if the perfect correlations
are to be explained locally) it seems that Bell himself
would agree that this important aspect of his 1964 paper
could and should have been strengthened.
But let us not lose sight of the big picture here. The
EPR argument – and the EPR-ish argument given by
Einstein in the passages surrounding the sentence cited
three times by Bell, including in the very sentence we
have just been scrutinizing – were, in the context of Bell’s
1964 paper, “prior work”. Bell was (rightly or wrongly)
taking that prior work as given, taking its results as al-
ready established. And so even in the important first
paragraph of “2 Formulation” we should not understand
him as attempting to present a fully rigorous and de-
tailed version of the argument (“from locality to deter-
ministic hidden variables”). Instead, I think, we should
understand him as giving a quick overview of this earlier
argument, the fuller version of which he invites his read-
ers to find in the Einstein (et al.) papers (that is, the
“Autobiographical Notes” and the EPR paper) which he
explicitly references.
In summary, I think that in 1964 Bell was taking for
3 Indeed, it is not even really clear how one should relate ordinary
quantum mechanics (with realistically-interpreted and collapsing
wave functions) to what Bell writes here in words. In ordinary
QM, the orientation of the distant magnet certainly does influ-
ence the “real factual situation” (on which much more later) of
the nearby particle; and then the “real factual situation” of that
nearby particle certainly does “influence the result obtained” in
the nearby measurement. But, because each of these influences
involves some randomness, it turns out that the nearby measure-
ment outcome is statistically independent of the distant setting
(i.e., it turns out that PI is respected). So, has the distant mag-
net setting influenced the nearby result? It is simply not clear.
granted that Einstein et al. had previously established
that determinism was required in order to provide a lo-
cal account of the perfect (EPR) correlations. The main
new result Bell presented in 1964 was that this partic-
ular method of attempting to restore locality to quan-
tum mechanics could not succeed, since local determin-
istic (hidden variable) theories could not reproduce the
QM predictions for a wider class of possible experiments.
But to summarize the significance of Bell’s 1964 paper
by saying that he demonstrated a conflict between the
QM predictions and the joint assumptions of “locality”
and “determinism” is to simply ignore the crucial foun-
dational role played by the earlier work of Einstein et al.
It is clear that, for Bell, the significance of his new result
was to show that locality simply cannot be maintained if
the quantum predictions are correct: “It is the require-
ment of locality ... that creates the essential difficulty.”
IV. DISCUSSION
So, whose reading of Bell’s 1964 paper is correct? One
important piece of evidence in support of my reading is
simply that it agrees with what Bell himself later says
about what he had been up to in 1964. Of course, such
testimony is only reliable to the extent that there is inde-
pendent evidence that Bell was an honest reporter about
his own earlier work. But here there is literally univer-
sal agreement, among those who knew him and worked
with him, that Bell was an almost uniquely humble, hon-
est, and forthright person who took extreme care to get
details right and to always err on the side of crediting
others rather than himself. I would also submit, as rel-
evant evidence, Bell’s 1977 remarks on “Free variables
and local causality”, which include the following open
confession of an earlier mistake (having nothing directly
to do with what’s at issue here): “Here I must concede at
once that the hypothesis becomes quite inadequate when
weakened in this way. The theorem no longer follows. I
was mistaken.” [7] Clearly Bell had no difficulty admit-
ting mistakes when he made them.
Wiseman’s interpretation, which requires one to be-
lieve that Bell made a mistake in 1964 and then engaged
in a decades-long terminological cover-up campaign, sim-
ply does not seem plausible given what we know about
Bell.4 But there are many other and more direct reasons
4 Wiseman denies that he is “accusing Bell or his followers of in-
tellectual dishonesty”. But for me this is difficult to reconcile
with his description of what must have happened subsequently
(under the assumption, of course, that Wiseman is right about
what Bell meant by “locality” in 1964): “once Bell had explicitly
defined [local causality in 1976], he wished all previous localis-
tic notions he had used, in particular the notion of [Parameter
Independence], to be forgotten. Moreover, after a few years he
became convinced that it was the notion of [local causality] that
he had in mind all along. [For example], Bell implies in 1981
that both he and Einstein were always using the notion of [local
7to reject Wiseman’s interpretation.
First and foremost, Wiseman’s reading requires us to
understand Bell to have meant, by “locality”, the con-
dition that would later become known as Parameter In-
dependence. This, I submit, is completely and utterly
implausible. I previously noted that Wiseman’s inter-
pretation fails to meet all three of the criteria that arise
already in the first two sentences of Bell’s paper. Further-
more, and more even directly, nothing like my Equation
(1) – expressing PI – appears anywhere in Bell’s paper.
Nor does Bell say, in words, anything that can in any
direct sense be translated as PI – which, of course, is a
statement about probabilities. All of the statements that
Bell makes (in his own voice) about locality in 1964 are
statements about “the reading” of an instrument or “the
result” of an experiment. That is, they are statements
that can only really be directly translated into mathemat-
ics in the context of specifically deterministic theories. I
think that if one really wanted to attempt to capture, in
a mathematical expression, what Bell says in words, it
would look like this:
A(a, b, λ) = A(a, λ). (3)
In arriving instead at his mathematical translation, our
Equation (1) above, of Bell’s various words, Wiseman is
thus clearly engaging in some pretty creative interpreta-
tion.
Recall that Bell makes very clear, by citing Einstein
three different times, that his general notion of locality
– as opposed to the specific implication of it that he ap-
plies to deterministic theories – was the notion that Bell
understood Einstein to have in mind when he (Einstein)
wrote:
“But on one supposition we should, in my
opinion, absolutely hold fast: the real factual
situation of the system S2 is independent of
what is done with the system S1, which is
spatially separated from the former.”
Does Wiseman thus mean to suggest that this passage
also expresses Parameter Independence? As noted ear-
lier, Wiseman takes Einstein’s “real factual situation” of
some system to denote “what is probed by measuring
it” and takes Einstein’s idea of a system being “indepen-
dent” of distant operations as meaning that the distant
causality], which Bell characterises later in this 1981 paper in
the same way [he had described it] in 1976. As argued [previ-
ously] there is only one plausible reading of ‘locality’ in Bell’s
1964 paper, and it is not [local causality].” Needless to say, I
find it very troubling that, for Wiseman, it is not even plausible
to consider that Bell might have meant, by “locality”, the sort of
condition given by Einstein in the passage he referenced, three
times, apparently by way of telling us what he meant by “local-
ity”... and that, by contrast, Wiseman does consider it entirely
plausible (and indeed conclusively established) that Bell in effect
lied, successfully, to himself about what he had meant.
“action has no statistical effect”. This strange, vaguely
operationalist gloss on Einstein’s words seems suspicious
to me, as if Wiseman is indeed trying to suggest that
Einstein, too, should be interpreted as having meant Pa-
rameter Independence. That, of course, would be ridicu-
lous. But there is also an indication (when he writes
that “Bell’s definition of locality follows from the suppo-
sition of Einstein’s which [Bell] quotes”) that in Wise-
man’s view Einstein’s notion of locality is distinct from
and more generalized than PI.
But then why would Bell specifically cite this “supposi-
tion of Einstein’s” three different times, in contexts where
it is clear that Bell takes the passage to be explicating
and clarifying the concept of “locality”, if Bell actually
meant, by “locality”, something distinct and narrower?
Wiseman simply never provides an answer to this crucial
question.
It is worthwhile to step back and look also at the pas-
sages from Einstein’s “Autobiographical Notes” that sur-
round the partial sentence quoted by Bell. The several-
pages-long discussion of quantum incompleteness begins
as follows:
“Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp
reality as it is thought independently of its
being observed. In this sense one speaks of
‘physical reality.’ In pre-quantum physics
there was no doubt as to how this was to
be understood. In Newton’s theory reality
was determined by a material point in space
and time; in Maxwell’s theory, by the field
in space and time. In quantum mechanics
it is not so easily seen. If one asks: does
a ψ-function of the quantum theory repre-
sent a real factual situation in the same sense
in which this is the case of a material sys-
tem of points or of an electromagnetic field,
one hesitates to reply with a simple ‘yes’ or
‘no’; why? What the ψ-function (at a definite
time) asserts, is this: What is the probability
for finding a definite physical magnitude q (or
p) in a definitely given interval, if I measure
it at time t? The probability is here to be
viewed as an empirically determinable, and
therefore certainly as a ‘real’ quantity which I
may determine if I create the same ψ-function
very often and perform a q-measurement each
time. But what about the single measured
value of q? Did the respective individual sys-
tem have this q-value even before the mea-
surement?”
The first sentence already makes perfectly clear that Ein-
stein was not using phrases like “real factual situation”
in the operationalist sense that Wiseman’s interpretation
suggests. And similarly, Einstein’s focus on “the single
measured value” and “the individual system” make it
clear that he is not merely interested in the “statistical”
type of effect that Wiseman describes.
8It is worth continuing with Einstein’s discussion. Pick-
ing up where the previous quote left off:
“To this question there is no definite answer
within the framework of the [existing] theory,
since the measurement is a process which im-
plies a finite disturbance of the system from
the outside; it would therefore be thinkable
that the system obtains a definite numeri-
cal value for q (or p) the measured numerical
value, only through the measurement itself.
For the further discussion I shall assume two
physicists, A and B, who represent a different
conception with reference to the real situation
as described by the ψ-function.
“A. The individual system (before the mea-
surement) has a definite value of q (i.e., p) for
all variables of the system, and more specif-
ically, that value which is determined by a
measurement of this variable. Proceeding
from this conception, he will state: The ψ-
function is no exhaustive description of the
real situation of the system but an incom-
plete description; it expresses only what we
know on the basis of former measurements
concerning the system.
“B. The individual system (before the mea-
surement) has no definite value of q (i.e., p).
The value of the measurement only arises
in coorperation with the unique probability
which is given to it in view of the ψ-function
only through the act of measurement itself.
Proceeding from this conception he will (or,
at least, he may) state: the ψ-function is an
exhaustive description of the real situation of
the system.”
Einstein thus sets up a dilemma between two different
views one might take. According to the “A” view, the
distant system already possesses definite, pre-determined
values “for all variables”. We may find out the value of
one of these variables by making an appropriate sort of
measurement on the entangled nearby system. But we do
not influence or create those distant values. Of course,
the existence of such pre-determined values requires us
to say that the ψ-function fails to provide a complete de-
scription of the real physical state of the distant system.
On the other hand, according to the “B” view, the
ψ-function can be claimed to provide a complete descrip-
tion of the real physical state of the distant system be-
cause definite pre-determined values are no part of that
real physical state. But then, as Einstein goes on to ex-
plain, the quantum state ψ2 of the distant system S2
“depends upon what kind of measurement I undertake
on S1”. Continuing:
“Now it appears to me that one may speak of
the real factual situation of the partial sys-
tem S2. Of this real factual situation, we
know to begin with, before the measurement
of S1, even less than we know of a system de-
scribed by the [original, pre-measurement] ψ-
function. But on one supposition we should,
in my opinion, absolutely hold fast: the real
factual situation of the system S2 is inde-
pendent of what is done with the system S1,
which is spatially separated from the former.
According to the type of measurement which
I make of S1, I get, however, a very different
ψ2 for the second partial system (φ2, φ
1
2, ...).
Now, however, the real situation of S2 must
be independent of what happens to S1. For
the same real situation of S2 it is possible
therefore to find, according to one’s choice,
different types of ψ-function. (One can es-
cape from this conclusion only by either as-
suming that the measurement of S1 ((tele-
pathically)) changes the real situation of S2
or by denying independent real situations as
such to things which are spatially separated
from each other. Both alternatives appear to
me entirely unacceptable.)”
What Einstein describes as “unacceptable” is unaccept-
able precisely in the sense of violating the notion of lo-
cality that he has articulated previously (in the sentence
partially quoted by Bell). So the upshot of Einstein’s dis-
cussion – which Einstein goes on to state in the follow-
ing paragraph – is that the “B” view described earlier is
unacceptable (i.e., non-local). And that of course leaves
only the “A” view, which, remember, involves attributing
definite pre-measurement values “for all variables” asso-
ciated with the distant system. Einstein’s conclusion is,
in short, that the only way to avoid an “unacceptable”
kind of nonlocality is to posit local deterministic hidden
variables.
I have quoted and summarized this passage from Ein-
stein’s “Autobiographical Notes” at such length because
it allows several crucial points to be made about Bell’s
1964 paper and Wiseman’s interpretation thereof. I have
already noted the complete implausibility of Wiseman’s
operationalistic reading of Einstein. Let us also now con-
sider Wiseman’s charge that Bell “made a mistake” when
he (Bell) summarized Einstein et al. as follows:
“Since we can predict in advance the result
of measuring any chosen component of σ2 by
previously measuring the same component of
σ1, it follows that the result of any such mea-
surement must actually be predetermined.”
Of course, Wiseman’s claim that the argument sketched
here is invalid (“a mistake”) is based on Wiseman’s in-
terpretation that Bell meant, by “locality”, PI. I have
already explained why I find that interpretation implau-
sible.
But how exactly does Wiseman’s accusation relate to
Einstein and EPR? As I pointed out above, it seems (al-
though it is admittedly not completely clear) that Wise-
9man recognizes Einstein’s conception of locality (and
apparently also that involved in the EPR argument)
as broader than PI. Wiseman also writes that “EPR’s
premises ... are not equivalent to [Parameter Inde-
pendence] and they do justify the conclusion of pre-
determined outcomes.” So what exactly is the nature of
the “mistake” that Wiseman is accusing Bell of having
committed?
Is it that Bell was not attempting to rehearse the ear-
lier EPR argument, but was instead attempting to re-
place it with a new (and invalid!) argument involving a
narrower concept of “locality”? Or is it that, although
Bell was attempting to rehearse the earlier EPR argu-
ment, he failed to capture it perfectly (in his two-sentence
recapitulation) and this supposed mistake somehow dis-
qualifies that aspect of his paper from consideration? Or
does Wiseman think that, although an EPR-type argu-
ment from (something like Einstein’s generalized notion
of) locality, to deterministic hidden variables, can be
made rigorous, it was never made so until he, Wiseman,
made it so in his 2014 paper – and that is why “Bell’s
EPR paragraph forms no part of his 1964 theorem”? I
see no other available alternatives, yet none of these are
remotely reasonable as justifications for excluding, from
consideration, the EPR part of Bell’s two-part argument.
Wiseman says that Bell’s mistake has “no impact on
the main result of his paper.” It is of course true that
the EPR argument is irrelevant to “the main result” if
one arbitrary stipulates “the main result” to be that the
quantum predictions are inconsistent with the joint as-
sumptions of locality and determinism. But whether or
not that is “the main result” is precisely what is funda-
mentally at issue in this debate, and it should be clear
that the EPR argument is quite crucial here. If the EPR
argument (“from locality to deterministic hidden vari-
ables”) is valid, then “the main result” of Bell’s 1964
paper is that the quantum predictions are inconsistent
with the single unitary assumption of locality (meaning,
of course, the generalized notion of Einstein/EPR, not
PI). And the whole idea that there are two distinct Bell’s
theorems falls apart.
Wiseman’s suggestion that orthodox quantum me-
chanics is some kind of “counter-example” to Einstein’s
argument (which Bell means to be summarizing) also un-
derscores the implausibly creative nature of Wiseman’s
interpretation. Einstein’s entire several-page-long dis-
cussion (quoted above) is fundamentally about orthodox
quantum mechanics and how it is, and isn’t, possible to
understand that theory vis-a-vis locality and complete-
ness. The idea that Einstein (or Bell) somehow made
an argument for locally pre-determined values, but with-
out bothering to consider the concrete example of ortho-
dox quantum mechanics, is simply ludicrous. Einstein’s
whole argument is embedded in a discussion of orthodox
quantum mechanics from the very beginning.
Later in his paper, Wiseman considers (only to then
dismiss it) the possibility that Bell might have meant, by
“locality”, the condition articulated by Einstein in the
above-quoted passage where Einstein speaks of one mea-
surement “telepathically” influencing the other. Wise-
man writes:
“Now although Bell seemed to indicate
(twice) [sic] that this [“no telepathy” condi-
tion] was equivalent to his definition of local-
ity, it is different in that it requires not that
Bob’s result B be independent of Alice’s set-
ting a, but rather that the ‘real factual situ-
ation’ of Bob’s system be thus independent.”
Indeed, as Wiseman proceeds to acknowledge, Einstein’s
“no telepathy” notion of locality “has the same force as
local causality” and hence would support a valid infer-
ence to deterministic hidden variables.5 But Wiseman
dismisses this as irrelevant. As we have already seen,
Wiseman is simply unwilling to believe Bell even when
he (Bell) indicates repeatedly that what he means by “lo-
cality” is what Einstein articulates in the essay he cites.
And the existence of a valid argument from Einstein’s
“no telepathy” version of locality to deterministic hid-
den variables is also supposedly irrelevant because, ac-
cording to Wiseman, Einstein does not “use it there [i.e.,
in his “Autobiographical Notes”] to make the argument
that Bell wants to make, from predictability to determin-
ism.” But, as is plain from the passages from Einstein’s
essay that I have quoted above, this is at best mislead-
ing. Einstein’s discussion in “Autobiographical Notes”
does indeed conclude that deterministic hidden-variables
are needed in order to avoid unacceptable non-locality.
One can dispute the rigor with which that conclusion is
argued for in that particular discussion,6 but of course
5 Strictly speaking this inference requires the additional assump-
tion “(which ... Einstein makes explicitly) that systems have real
factual situations”. Recall that “denying independent real situ-
ations as such to things which are spatially separated from each
other” was one of the two things that Einstein jointly described
as “entirely unacceptable”. In my opinion, and probably that
of Einstein, one must clearly accept that spatially-separated sys-
tems have their own “real situations” before one can even mean-
ingfully ask whether locality is respected. (It is obvious, for ex-
ample, that Einstein’s formulation of locality – the passage cited
three times by Bell – becomes incoherent if one does not already
accept “that systems have real factual situations.”) The addi-
tional required assumption here would thus seem to be a logical
precondition for discussing locality, rather than something one
might coherently deny instead of locality. Note that this point is
closely related to the important point that Bell would later ex-
press by insisting that the notion of locality must be formulated
“in terms of local beables.” [8]
6 Einstein’s argument in the “Autobiographical Notes” basically
takes the following form: either A or B; not B; therefore A. As
I noted earlier, A here includes the idea of deterministic hidden
variables. But as Matt Pusey correctly pointed out during the
discussion of this paper in the IJQF “John Bell Workshop 2014”,
there are two slightly different sub-versions of B – one the de-
nial of pre-determination, and one the more specific claim that
quantum wave functions provide complete descriptions of physi-
cal states. In the “Autobiographical Notes” Einstein gives a very
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what Bell and all of us now have in mind here is the
EPR argument explicitly involving perfect correlations.
To sum up, Wiseman’s interpretation requires us to
believe things about the views of both Einstein and Bell
that are so completely at odds with what is known gen-
erally about these thinkers – and so completely at odds
with what they explicitly wrote in the specific passages
in question – that I don’t think it can be taken at all seri-
ously as capturing what Bell was actually doing in 1964.
Wiseman writes, in a footnote, that “there is no evi-
dence to support the suggestion (Norsen, pers. comm.)
that Bell began with a general notion of locality, along
the lines of local causality, and only narrowed it to this
definition after he had established determinism via his
EPR paragraph.” I am truly at a loss to understand how
Wiseman could say this, since he himself has reviewed
the extensive and overwhelming evidence: Einstein’s for-
mulation of locality, which Bell repeatedly cites, is pre-
cisely a “general notion of locality, along the lines of
local causality”, quite distinct from PI, which allows a
perfectly valid argument “from locality to deterministic
hidden variables”, an argument which Einstein rehearses
in the paragraphs immediately surrounding the sentence
that Bell repeatedly cites and which Einstein et al. gave
in the EPR paper that Bell also cites.
Wiseman, as far as I can tell, accepts all of this and yet
still somehow believes that the first paragraph of Bell’s “2
Formulation” is merely “a one-paragraph motivation for
considering hidden variable theories.” I think it is clear
that it is more than this. It is the first part of Bell’s
overall two-part argument. It’s just that Bell is taking
the first part as earlier work, as a previously-established
result that he need not rehearse in rigorous detail, but
may simply refer to and briefly summarize.
This leaves, to my mind, only one question: given that
in 1964 Bell presented his new result as the second part
of a two-part argument for the overall conclusion of non-
locality (the first part of which was of course the ear-
lier EPR/Einstein argument), which portion, exactly, of
this two-part argument deserves to be called “Bell’s the-
orem”?
Here I know from private communication that, when
pressed in some of the ways I’ve tried to lay out above,
Wiseman retreats in the direction of saying that, while
perhaps Bell may indeed have had the full two-part argu-
ment in mind from the beginning, only the second part
of it (the part that was novel in 1964) deserves the ep-
clear argument, based on locality, against the second sub-version
of B. And of course the EPR paper provides an argument, again
based on locality (although in the EPR text – written by Podol-
sky – the meaning and role of locality were not made particularly
clear), against the first sub-version of B. So it is probably cor-
rect to say that, taking the “Autobiographical Notes” alone, the
argument for pre-determined values contains a kind of gap – but
also that, together, the “Autobiographical Notes” and the origi-
nal EPR paper jointly contain precisely the argument that “Bell
wants to make”.
ithet “theorem”. But this strikes me as a terminologi-
cal shell-game. If a commentator wants to reserve the
word “theorem” for demonstrations meeting some mini-
mal threshold of rigor (and chooses to place the thresh-
old somewhere between the level found in Einstein’s two
cited papers and what Bell did after the first paragraph
of “2 Formulation” in his 1964 paper) I would have no
objection, so long as the commentator articulates clearly
that “Bell’s theorem”, when combined with the earlier
“EPR/Einstein non-theorem” establishing the need for
deterministic hidden variables, leads to the overall con-
clusion that the QM predictions are incompatible with lo-
cality... and that this is what Bell took himself to have es-
tablished already in 1964. I would even have no objection
if such a commentator raised questions about whether
this incompatibility was really established in 1964, since
(the commentator might plausibly argue) genuinely es-
tablishing such a conclusion requires that all parts of the
argument leading to it meet the commentator’s thresh-
old for theoremhood. What I do object to, however, is
the gross historical mischaracterization that is involved
in Wiseman’s almost complete dismissal of the role of
the EPR/Einstein argument (or non-theorem or what-
ever one wants to call it) in Bell’s 1964 paper. At the
end of the day, and setting terminological games aside,
Wiseman’s account of what Bell did in 1964 is simply in-
accurate in that it fails to capture an essential aspect of
what Bell actually established (and took himself to have
established).7
The long-standing disagreements about what Bell did,
therefore, cannot simply be understood as mere miscom-
munications, based on the existence of two quite distinct
“Bell’s theorems”. The disagreements are instead fun-
damentally based on the failure – of Wiseman’s “opera-
tionalists” and also apparently Wiseman himself – to ap-
preciate the foundational role of the EPR/Einstein argu-
ment (“from locality to deterministic hidden variables”)
in Bell’s 1964 paper. Wiseman’s paper may perhaps be
doing some good in so far as his project involves making
it more widely known that Bell did eventually establish a
direct conflict between locality (alone) and the quantum
predictions. But in so far as his strategy involves telling
the “operationalists” that they were right all along, in
how they understood Bell’s 1964 paper, Wiseman is dis-
torting the historical record, muddying the waters, and
doing a great disservice to Bell on this 50th anniversary
of his great achievement.
7 As I pointed out in the IJQF “John Bell Workshop 2014” dis-
cussion of Wiseman’s response to this paper, it is anachronistic
to even obsess over what part, exactly, of what Bell did in 1964
ought to be included as part of “Bell’s Theorem.” There is of
course no harm in saying that we are celebrating the 50th an-
niversary of “Bell’s Theorem”. But the truth is that we are
celebrating the 50th anniversary of Bell’s important 1964 paper.
(The very phrase “Bell’s Theorem” is a modern invention, which
certainly played no role in Bell’s thinking circa 1964.)
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